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Abstract 
In this article, several regression analyses are conducted to analyse the relationship of credit information shar-
ing (by both private credit bureaus and public credit registries) with financial inclusion and financial interme-
diation. We find that there is a positive relationship between information sharing mechanisms and financial 
inclusion (measured by account (at a financial institution), borrowed from a financial institution, and domestic 
credit). We do not find significant results for bank performance parameters. Whereas this is the case with bank 
non-performing loans, the data do not allow (due to low R2) drawing conclusions on other parameters such as 
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Introduction 
The focus of this article is on the economic effects of private credit bureaus (PCB) and public credit registries 
(PCR), especially on financial inclusion and on financial intermediation. Those institutions are part of a spe-
cific (national and international) credit reporting system, comprising additionally other institutions, individu-
als, culture, legal and regulating frameworks, technology, procedures and standards. The objective of this 
system is to collect and combine information (in a database) on (potential) borrowers. This information can 
be relevant for the efficiency of the credit providing decision-making process (cp. World Bank, 2012, p. 5; 
Miller, 2003, pp. 27-28). Historically, the first public credit registry was introduced after the Great Depression, 
1934 in Germany and several others in Europe after the Second World War (for a longer and more in-depth 
introduction e.g. Schmieder, 2006, pp. 653-654). Especially since 2001, when the International Finance Cor-
poration (IFC), which is part of the World Bank Group, set up the Global Credit Reporting Program (first 
introduced as Global Credit Bureau Program and later renamed to its current name to reflect the change of 
scope with both private credit bureaus and public credit register), more information about these entities seems 
to exist, while considerable progress in this sector, in terms of newly established registries/bureaus was ob-
servable since then (World Bank – International Finance Corporation, 2015). This can be easily seen in the 
increase of the total amount of public credit registers and private credit bureaus. While in the year 2004 a total 
of 49 economies had a private credit bureau (22 for public credit registry) with a coverage of at least 5% of 
the adult population out of 145 observed ones, this number was already up to 94 (58) out of 189 economies 
in 2014 (World Bank – International Finance Corporation, 2014, p. 72). Based on the latest available data 
from 2016, 38 countries do have both, a credit bureau and a credit registry, 108 have only a credit bureau, 93 
have only a credit registry and 27 have neither (measured based on the latest Doing Business dataset of the 
World Bank, if coverage rate by credit bureau or credit register was higher than zero, the presence of such an 
entity was counted, cp. World Bank, 2017).  
As credit is often praised as the lifeblood of an economy (e.g. Cork, 1982, p. 10: „Credit is the lifeblood of 
the modern industrialised economy.”), it is obvious that it is of utmost importance for an economy or an 
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economically integrated region, to have a healthy, sound and sustainable credit market. However, as PCB/PCR 
may decrease the asymmetric information between a potential debtor and a creditor, they may have a positive 
impact on financial inclusion, too. Next to that we also test for the impact of such systems on various indicators 
of bank performance.   
This article starts with the background and (possible) associated problems arising in a creditor/debtor rela-
tionship and an overview of the literature in this context. Next, we discuss our hypotheses, methodology and 
data used before we present our empirical results and finish with our concluding remarks. 
1. Literature review 
Asymmetric information in a market may lead to unwanted effects such as adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970; 
Ausubel, 1999) or credit rationing (Jaffee/Russell, 1976; Stiglitz/Weiss, 1981). Credit information sharing 
presents a solution to reduce these effects and mitigate moral hazard as well; as shown by Klein (1992) in a 
game theory model, credit reporting promotes morality by borrowers. Pagano and Jappelli (1993) showed in 
their model with adverse selection, among other results, that the incentive to share information for the lenders 
increases with the mobility and heterogeneity of the borrowers as well as with the size of the credit market. 
However, the fear of potential market entrants reduces these incentives. This all suggests that with information 
about the borrowers being shared, the pool of borrowers should improve, the risks of defaults should be re-
duced, and in some circumstances, the volume of lending should increase. Similarly, as shown in the model 
of Padilla and Pagano (1997), default rates are lower when information sharing takes place, interest rates are 
predicted to decrease and the total volume of lending to increase. In line with that, Bennardo et al. (2015) also 
show in their theoretical work that information sharing reduces default and interest rates. Next to that, credit 
access improves, at least where the value of collateral is not very volatile. The model of McIntosh and Wydick 
(2009) decomposes the overall effect of credit information sharing into three: a screening effect, an incentive 
effect with lower borrower default rates, and a credit expansion effect which increases default rates from 
larger loans (even though the former seem to overwhelm the latter in an overall view). In another model, 
Padilla and Pagano (2000) show that the disciplinary effect on borrowers from sharing information between 
lending institutions reduces default and interest rates. However, they show that this depends also on the type 
of information that is shared. Sharing more than default information may reduce borrower’s incentive to per-
form well. Similarly, Vercammen (1995) discusses the optimal length of time that information of a borrower’s 
credit report should be kept in the records. He shows that excessively long credit histories may have negative 
welfare impacts. McIntosh and Wydick (2005) are in favor of adding credit bureaus to the microfinance lend-
ing system, because more competition between micro-finance institutions is expected to result in higher in-
formation asymmetries and hence a worsening outcome for all borrowers. Finally, Brown and Zehnder (2010) 
find that on the one hand, asymmetric information in credit markets increases the frequency of information 
sharing, whereas on the other, stronger competition between lenders tends to have the opposite effect.  
Besides the aforementioned theoretical papers, several empirical findings exist on the subject. Bruhn et al. 
(2013) studied the emergence of credit reporting institutions and find that countries with lower entry barriers 
into the credit market are less likely to have a credit bureau. The same can be found in countries, where bank 
concentration is high. However, where banks participation in information sharing with a credit registry is 
mandatory, they also find no significant results on bank competition or concentration. Love and Mylenko 
(2003) focus on the effect of information sharing for businesses. While they find that the existence of credit 
bureaus is linked to lower financing constraints (as perceived by managers) as well as a higher share of bank 
financing, they find no significant results for the former with credit registries. Stronger rule of law seems to 
have an additional important positive effect on the effectiveness of credit bureaus. Brown et al. (2009) who 
also focus on firms find that information sharing is associated with both improved availability and lower cost 
of credit to them and even more so in countries with weak legal environments. In a more recent paper, Peria 
and Singh (2014) are able to find a significant impact on corporate finance by credit bureaus, but not by credit 
registry. The introduction of a credit bureau increases the likelihood of access to finance for firms and results 
in a drop of interest rates, amongst other aspects. These effects are more pronounced the higher the coverage 
rate and scope as well as accessibility of credit bureaus, and the weaker national contract enforcement is. 
Luoto et al. (2007) focus on the microfinance credit market in Guatemala and find that credit information 
systems can improve lending performance. Similarly, de Janvry et al. (2010), who also focus on the Guate-
malan microfinance sector, found that a reduction in information asymmetry resulted in efficiency gains for 
the lender, which were augmented when borrowers understood how the system worked. On the other hand, 
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Behr and Sonnekalb (2012) concentrate on the effects of the introduction of a credit registry in Albania. They 
cannot find evidence that access to or cost of credit are affected but that loan performances improves. This is 
especially the case for repeat borrowers, and where competition is weak and borrowers are concerned about 
future access to credit. Gietzen (2016) analyses empirical data on the impact of the introduction of credit 
information sharing in an African banking market. He finds support that adverse selection problems are miti-
gated. Repeating borrowers enjoy reduced interest rates and customers who switch institutions tend to profit 
from this. On the other hand, first time loans tend to become pricier, as banks have less capacity to hold good 
borrowers, but this effect is outweighed with the reduction in costs for follow-up loans.  
We also find papers which focus on the effect of information sharing by cross country analysis. Fosu (2014) 
focuses on African countries and finds that credit information sharing increases bank lending, whereas this 
effect is moderated by bank market concentration. In an early attempt, Jappelli and Pagano (2002) find that 
both bank lending is higher and credit risk is lower in countries who do have an information sharing mecha-
nism among lenders (regardless whether a public or private one). Djankov et al. (2007) investigate 129 coun-
tries and the effect of legal creditor rights as well as credit bureaus and registers on private credits. Both 
information sharing and legal rights have a positive impact on private credit to GDP. Houston et al. (2010), 
who analyze 69 countries, find among other things that credit information sharing leads to higher bank prof-
itability, lower bank risk, as well as to a reduced likelihood of financial crisis and higher economic growth on 
a macroeconomic level. Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2012) find that credit information sharing (especially) 
reduces the likelihood of banking crisis (in low income countries). Giannetti and Jentzsch (2013), who analyze 
172 countries from the year 2000 to 2008 conduct a difference-in-difference analysis, where they focus on the 
introduction of a national identification system and the interplay with credit reporting on financial intermedi-
ation (bank credit to deposits, net interest margin) and -inclusion (private credit to GDP). They find slightly 
positive effects on both, where developed credit reporting systems exist. Similarly, Nana (2014) checks for 
the effect of legal systems and information-sharing and finds that the former is associated with better contract 
enforceability, whereas the latter with higher private credit to GDP. 
2. Research hypotheses 
The theoretical discussion as well as the review of the empirical literature raises a number of questions that 
we are trying to follow in this paper on the effect of the institution of credit reporting systems on particular 
features of the financial sector. We formulate these questions in a number of hypotheses outlined below, 
whereby we distinguish broadly between two main areas: the first one is about financial inclusion and the 
second one about banking related effects.  
H1: Credit reporting systems have a positive effect on financial inclusion.  
H1a: Credit reporting systems have a positive effect on the share of the population with an account 
(at a financial institution) 
H1b: Similarly, the share of those, who borrow from a financial system increases, resp. credit infor-
mation sharing has a positive effect on the borrowing rate 
H1c: The overall rate of domestic credit to the private sector increases with the coverage of credit 
information systems 
H2: Credit reporting systems have effects on the banking-sector 
H2a: Credit information sharing has a negative effect on non-performing loans 
H2b: Credit information sharing decreases the lending minus inflation rate  
H2c: Credit information sharing decreases banking concentration and has a positive effect on the sta-
bility of the banking system 
3. Data and methodology 
We retrieved country-level data mainly from a number of data bases of the World Bank and added some 
information from the International Monetary Fund and the Heritage Foundation. To test our hypotheses, we 
tested several (panel) models by use of linear OLS regressions (a detailed summary and description of the 
variables used can be found in the appendix).  
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Due to the fact that our database is unbalanced, the Levin-Lin-Chu and Hadri Lagrange multiplier stationary 
test could not test for unit roots. We find variance inflation factors below 3 and thus conclude to have no 
problem with multicollinearity. Additionally, we conducted a pairwise correlation calculation of all independ-
ent variables (legal origin – scan is omitted in the regressions and thus excluded) and in fact, no coefficient 
turns out to be higher than 0.65.  
Table 1. Correlation matrix of the independent variables 
 
To decide which type of regression model to use with the panel data over years and countries (simple OLS or 
fixed vs. random effects model), we conducted several pre-tests. Whereas the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange mul-
tiplier test significantly indicates that a pooled regression without considering effects is not appropriate, the 
Hausman test shows significant results for a fixed-effect model, as expected for such country-level data. The 
Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence could not be conducted because of too few common observations 
across the panel. Because we find significant results when testing for time-fixed effects, we add them in our 
models. Additionally, the Breusch-Pagan test establishes heteroskedasticy, so that we use robust heterosce-
dasticity-consistent standard errors (Huber/White estimators, cp. White, 1980). When conducting the 
Wooldridge-test, we do find serial correlation, but as the panel consists only of a limited time span, far below 
20-30 years, this should not to be a problem for our test models.  
4. Empirical results 
The following part presents the results of our empirical analysis. In accordance with the list of hypotheses, we 
start with the various results related to financial inclusion (H1) and then turn to the results of the set of sub 
hypotheses for the banking sector (H2). 
4.1. Financial inclusion 
In order to participate and take full advantage of the financial system, it is especially necessary, first, to have 
access to an account (at a financial institution). Other signs of financial inclusion, such as the fraction of the 
population that has actually borrowed from a financial institution, as well as the amount of domestic credit 
extended to the private sector (by banks), provide even more insights into this. Therefore, we analyze the way 
that a number of relevant parameters are connected to financial inclusion (we do not want to use existing 
methods to fill up missing values (cp. e.g. Liu, 2016, pp. 441-473), as this could be done in different ways. 
Therefore, we show results with the data at hand only). 
4.1.1. Account (at a financial institution) 
For this dependent variable and the next one, data is only available for the years of 2011 and 2014. As a panel 
regression using only those two years would be not fruitful, we treat both years as equal in time and estimate 
a cross-sectional model by using the means of both years for each variable (where information for one year 
was missing, we used the data for the available year). The following table shows the regression outcomes with 
the dependent variable ‘Account’ denoting the share of the population that has access to an account of any 
kind (we also tested by use of the variable ‘Account at a financial institution’, which does not include the 
group of mobile money accounts and found similar statistical significant results – both sets of data differ only 
slightly and only for some countries).  
PCR 
coverage
PCB 
coverage BranchesCB Unemployment IOEF Popdensity
GDP 
per 
capita
GDP 
growth eng french ger soc
PCR coverage 1
PCB coverage -0.06 1
BranchesCB 0.23 0.29 1
Unemployment 0.13 0.04 0.15 1
IOEF 0.09 0.49 0.37 -0.02 1
Popdensity -0.06 0.10 0.00 -0.13 0.32 1
GDP per capita 0.00 0.42 0.37 -0.12 0.64 0.18 1
GDP growth 0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -0.25 0.03 0.03 -0.10 1
eng -0.29 0.02 -0.17 0.00 0.06 0.19 -0.03 0.10 1
french 0.25 -0.24 0.02 -0.06 -0.21 -0.10 -0.15 -0.08 -0.63 1
ger 0.06 0.30 0.18 0.17 0.23 -0.04 0.16 -0.05 -0.24 -0.34 1
soc 0.03 -0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.12 -0.06 -0.14 0.08 -0.19 -0.27 -0.10 1
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Dependent Variable: Account 
Number of obs = 142, R-squared = 0.7748, Adj R-squared = 0.7538  
Table 2. Results of the regression with the dependent variable Account 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>ItI [95% Conf. Interval] 
PCR coverage .3406079 .075199 4.53 0.000 .1918248 .489391 
PCB coverage .1244575 .0434147 2.87 0.005 .0385605 .2103544 
BranchesCB .2329686 .0758198 3.07 0.003 .0829572 .38298 
Unemployment -.1494961 .2440592 -0.61 0.541 -.6323733 .3333811 
IOEF .1922842 .1875785 1.03 0.307 -.1788445 .5634129 
Popdensity .0020737 .0016784 1.24 0.219 -.0012471 .0053945 
GDP per capita .000763 .0001019 7.49 0.000 .0005615 .0009646 
GDP growth -.8391331 .5636096 -1.49 0.139 -1.954248 .2759823 
eng -1.118506 9.063438 -0.12 0.902 -19.05074 16.81373 
french -19.07975 9.106617 -2.10 0.038 -37.09741 -1.062083 
ger 8.787441 9.357131 0.94 0.349 -9.725872 27.30075 
soc -11.18597 10.19619 -1.10 0.275 -31.35939 8.987436 
_cons 29.33757 14.08204 2.08 0.039 1.475921 57.19922 
We find significant results (at least at the 1% level) for both PCB and PCR coverage, as well as for Branch-
esCB and GDP per capita. This lends support to our hypothesis that the quality of the institution of a credit 
reporting system (measured as the extent of coverage in the population) does in fact have a positive effect on 
the share of the population with an account (at a financial institution), our first measure of financial inclusion. 
The variable legal origin (french) and the constant are both significant on a 5% level significant. 
4.1.2. Borrowed from a financial institution 
In the following, the results of the cross-sectional regression with the dependent variable ‘borrowed from a 
financial institution’ are summarized. Like before, we also have a relatively high R2 here. 
Dependent Variable: BorrowedFI 
Number of obs = 142, R-squared = 0.5052, Adj R-squared = 0.4592  
Table 3. Results of the regression with the dependent variable BorrowedFI 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>ItI [95% Conf. Interval] 
PCR coverage .0850114 .023425 3.63 0.000 .0386644 .1313583 
PCB coverage .0524475 .013524 3.88 0.000 .02569 .079205 
BranchesCB .0472294 .0236184 2.00 0.048 .0004999 .093959 
Unemployment -.096858 .0760261 -1.27 0.205 -.2472775 .0535616 
IOEF .1095887 .058432 1.88 0.063 -.0060204 .2251978 
Popdensity -.0010249 .0005228 -1.96 0.052 -.0020593 9.57e-06 
GDP per capita .0000473 .0000317 1.49 0.139 -.0000155 .0001101 
GDP growth .3715591 .1755682 2.12 0.036 .024193 .7189251 
eng -8.30485 2.823323 -2.94 0.004 -13.89086 -2.718836 
french -11.49603 2.836774 -4.05 0.000 -17.10865 -5.883403 
ger -11.36142 2.91481 -3.90 0.000 -17.12844 -5.594394 
soc -6.711119 3.176183 -2.11 0.037 -12.99527 -.4269632 
_cons 9.716388 4.38665 2.21 0.029 1.037293 18.39548 
Similar to the previous regression, we find consistent results and that both PCB and PCR coverage are signif-
icant at a 1% level. Due to missing values, there is much less data for our second regression with the dependent 
variable ‘BorrowersCB’ (we hence do not report the results in full in a table). We find some differences 
between the above results related to ‘BorrowedFI’ and the one for ‘BorrowersCB’: whereas the variable 
BranchesCB is significant at a 5% level for ‘BorrowedFI’ (see above table), it is not significant in the second 
model specification. The IOEF is significant on a 10% level in the ‘BorrowedFI’ version and even at a 5% 
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level in the second regression. Similarly, Popdensity is significant on a 10% level above, but at a 1% in the 
second regression. Whereas GDP per capita is not significant in the ‘BorrowedFI’ regression, but GDP growth 
is at a 5% level, it is the opposite in the second regression, where the former is significant at a 10% level 
significant but not GDO growth. Finally, the legal origin variables eng and french are significant in both 
regressions at a 1% level, but whereas this is also the case for ger in the ‘BorrowedFI’ model specification, 
the variable is omitted by the statistical programme in the second one. Soc variable and the constant term are 
significant at the 5% level in the above presented regression, but not in the second one on ‘BorrowersCB’.  
In toto, we are able to present two different test model specifications which both produce comparable results, 
and both of which are unambiguous with regard to the hypothesis H1b: The share of the population that is 
able to access the credit market by borrowing money from financial institutions or a commercial bank clearly 
increases with increasing coverage of the credit reporting systems. 
4.1.3. Domestic credit to private sector of GDP  
In contrast to the two previous regressions, we have sufficient data for the following hypotheses tests to use a 
panel structure over time, ranging from 2005 to 2014. The results are presented in Table 4: 
Dependent Variable: DcreditPS 
Number of obs = 1,110, Number of groups = 137, R-squared - overall = 0.5588  
Table 4. Results of the panel-regression with the dependent variable DcreditPS 
Variable Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>ItI [95% Conf. Interval] 
PCR coverage .0856921 .087232 0.98 0.328 -.0868146 .2581987 
PCB coverage .0680084 .0374235 1.82 0.071 -.0059988 .1420156 
Unemployment -.5245089 .3784394 -1.39 0.168 -1.272896 .2238779 
LMI .0244668 .1173468 0.21 0.835 -.2075935 .2565272 
IOEF .3785816 .2608219 1.45 0.149 -.1372095 .8943728 
BranchesCB .2341958 .2392492 0.98 0.329 -.238934 .7073257 
GDP per capita .0007809 .0010226 0.76 0.446 -.0012414 .0028032 
GDP growth -.2082091 .1182598 -1.76 0.081 -.4420751 .0256569 
time       
2006 2.152735 .8636886 2.49 0.014 .4447387 3.860732 
2007 3.256014 1.353742 2.41 0.018 .5789062 5.933121 
2008 4.135606 1.716251 2.41 0.017 .7416152 7.529597 
2009 5.680623 1.824191 3.11 0.002 2.073175 9.288071 
2010 6.071192 2.040933 2.97 0.003 2.035123 10.10726 
2011 4.906175 2.14865 2.28 0.024 .6570891 9.155261 
2012 4.783007 2.430961 1.97 0.051 -.0243653 9.590379 
2013 5.965884 2.782514 2.14 0.034 .4632939 11.46847 
2014 6.603525 3.457859 1.91 0.058 -.234601 13.44165 
cons 13.24141 17.12692 0.77 0.441 -279.7876 47.11094 
Again, we test different model specifications with the two alternative dependent variables ‘DcreditPS’ and 
‘DcreditbyB’. We find very similar results between those specifications: for both, there are significant (10% 
level) results for PCB coverage and GDP growth. This again suggests that the coverage of a credit reporting 
system (here only the private sector variant turns out to be significant, for the public, we cannot tell with H0 
not being rejected) does produce a larger overall rate of domestic credit to the private sector (H1c). In contrast 
to the above presented results for ‘DcreditPS’, the IOEF turns out to be significant (at the 10% level) in the 
second regression on ‘DcreditbyB’.  
4.2. Financial intermediation 
In contrast to the previous subchapter, we do not find such clear and significant results in the following panel 
regressions. Because we only get results with very low R2 for two of the three regression tests, and because 
the results for most independent variables turned out to be non-significant as well, we decided to not publish 
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the results of the models for H2b (effect on the deflated lending rate) and for H2c (effect on banking concen-
tration and stability of the banking system) at all. For those, we do not find support for our hypotheses. 
4.2.1. Bank non-performing loans to total gross loans 
For our hypothesis that credit information sharing systems should reduce the percentage of non-performing 
loans, we are able to establish a sound regression model, and yet, the two determinants of interest here, PCR 
coverage and PCB coverage both remain insignificant consistently.  
Dependent Variable: NPL  
Number of obs = 1,035, Number of groups = 124, R-squared - overall = 0.0629  
Table 5. Results of the panel-regression with the dependent variable NPL 
Variable Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>ItI [95% Conf. Interval] 
PCR coverage .0243851 .0236888 1.03 0.305 -.0225054 .0712757 
PCB coverage .0269058 .0167105 1.61 0.110 -.0061716 .0599832 
DcreditPS -.0398178 .0344794 -1.15 0.250 -.1080676 .0284321 
Unemployment .8247672 .1792056 4.60 0.000 .4700407 1.179494 
GDP per capita -.0000606 .0001015 -0.60 0.552 -.0002615 .0001404 
GDP growth -.1097572 .0717523 -1.53 0.129 -.2517865 .0322721 
Boone 2.79437 1.612031 1.73 0.086 -.3965473 5.985286 
IOEF .1616508 .2164847 0.75 0.457 -.2668674 .5901691 
Time 
2006 -.7552574 .3286041 -2.30 0.023 -1.405709 -.1048058 
2007 -1.015312 .5089121 -2.00 0.048 -2.022672 -.0079518 
2008 -1.940498 .7678843 -2.53 0.013 -3.460477 -.4205178 
2009 -1.313513 .7472642 -1.76 0.081 -2.792676 .1656509 
2010 -.6653035 .8147368 -0.82 0.416 -2.278025 .9474181 
2011 -1.406535 .9062277 -1.55 0.123 -3.200357 .3872871 
2012 -1.160394 .9375516 -1.24 0.218 -3.01622 .6954315 
2013 -.8573481 1.00037 -0.86 0.393 -2.837519 1.122823 
2014 -1.670183 1.023368 -1.63 0.105 -3.695878 .3555116 
_Cons -7.192776 12.23111 -0.59 0.558 -31.4035 17.01795 
Even when testing with lags of the dependent variable in an autoregressive model variant (the first few annual 
lags proved to be significant), both credit information sharing variables still turned out to be non-significant.  
4.2.2 Bank lending rate minus inflation rate and risk premium on lending  
Our assumption was that with the existence of credit information sharing systems, the risks for banks with 
(potential) borrowers declines and thus the real lending rate (deflated by the use of the consumer price index, 
to take into account different interest rates globally) resp. the RPOL should be able to stay lower. We kept a 
similar set of variables throughout the analysis in the paper for reasons of comparability and consistency, but 
we calculated a R2 below 1%. We interpret that we are not able to explain our dependent variable with the 
given independent variables in any sufficient and satisfactory manner to be able to come up with meaningful 
results that would allow us to interpret the tests with a view on the hypothesis. 
4.2.3. Bank concentration and stability of the banking system 
There are numerous variables which can be used as a proxy for bank concentration (cp. appendix). As in the 
previous subchapter, we retrieved very small R2 values (below 1%) and thus abstain from showing the results 
in a table. The same applies for the Z-Score. An exception exists for the lerner-index, where we calculated an 
R2 of 2.2%, which we deem to still be too small to consider the results, and with non-significant values for 
the two information sharing coverage ratios. Therefore, we cannot test our hypothesis that credit information 
sharing leads to less bank concentration in a country. As argued by Rona-Tas (2015, p. 179), it seems to be 
reasonable that credit information sharing does not necessarily result in more stable markets. Several countries 
with a long tradition of credit reporting and full file information systems (using both, negative as well as 
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positive information on consumers), seem to rank among the worst in relation to consumer debt amount. 
However, the simple amount may not show the full picture, as the distribution of debt among different classes 
is important as well. If poor consumers (or countries) add up even more debt, the situation may not be stable. 
Consequently, default problems seem to play a bigger role in poor countries. Four possible reasons seem to 
contradict a positive effect of credit reporting on stability: (1) Perverse effects: due to credit reporting, lending 
may increase, which may result in larger and riskier loans and new (riskier) borrowers entering the market, 
and overconfidence and relying (too) heavily on widely accepted automated tools; (2) Data quality resp. the 
social construction of data: some (negative) data may not be shared; errors may exist in the dataset, in highly 
concentrated markets, the big players have less incentive to share their data when data sharing is based on a 
voluntary process, and lenders who understand the scoring process might utilize this knowledge in their favor; 
(3) relational nature of lending: information asymmetry for both borrower and lenders may exist and should 
be solved, a borrower may not necessarily have more knowledge on his intention than lenders who may have 
a better understanding about the forces beyond the control or not foreseen by a borrower, as sickness or the 
economic development in a country, next, borrowing and repayment may not be entirely the business of the 
borrower but the actions taken by the lender, even if a loan is already granted, may be still important in the 
outcome (cp. about this point also Rona-Tas and Guseva, 2013, pp. 426-427); (4) endogeneity problem: Credit 
reporting systems based on past behavior have an outcome for future ones and may reward good behavior or 
sanction bad ones; and ultimately may result in vicious cycles, as they can influence a broad range of sectors. 
Giannetti et al. (2017), who focus on the public credit register show that banks manipulated their credit ratings 
by downgrading high quality and upgrading low quality borrowers before they shared their information. Such 
behavior may not only exist in the observed country and further limit the desired positive effects of credit 
information sharing as a whole. 
Conclusions 
The results for the financial inclusion part, where only data for the years 2011 and 2014 are available, should 
be seen as first, preliminary results on this issue and not be overrated. They indicate however, an empirically 
positive relationship between credit information sharing and financial inclusion (Account [at a financial insti-
tution], borrowing [from a financial institution], private credit / GDP). In total, these results seem to fit into 
the broader literature so far published about this topic. As new data on this issue will be published in 2018, 
more research should be conducted, using this new data and the updated resp. improved data on the previous 
years. 
There was more data available already now for the rest of our hypotheses tests (H1c through H2c), and we 
were able to run panel-regressions. However, we do not find significant results for an effect of credit reporting 
on non-performing loans and are not able to explain with our independent variables the effects on the real 
lending rate or bank concentration, as our R2 is too low.  
Overall, there seems to be some evidence on the positive relationship between credit information sharing and 
financial inclusion. Even though some evidence was presented in other papers on banking related effects of 
credit reporting, we were not able to find them based on our dataset and suggested some explanations of why 
such an effect may occur in the first place. Alas, those may be dominated by other effects, such as overconfi-
dence in these systems and the expansion of credit to customers not served before, which are probably riskier 
than the group of customers with a longer existing own credit history. 
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Appendix 
Table 1. Definitions and data sources of used variables 
Variable Symbol Definition Data source 
Dependent Variables       
5-bank asset concentration 5BC Assets of five largest banks as a share of total commercial banking assets. Raw data are from Bankscope. 
World Bank: Global Fi-
nancial Development 
Account (% age 15+) Account 
Percentage of respondents who report having an account (by 
themselves or together with someone else) at a bank or an-
other type of financial institution. For 2014 this can be a 
mobile account as well. 
World Bank: Global 
Findex 
Account at a financial insti-
tution (% age 15+) AccountFI 
Percentage of respondents who report having an account (by 
themselves or together with someone else) at a bank or an-
other type of financial institution. 
World Bank: Global 
Findex 
Bank concentration BC Assets of three largest commercial banks as a share of total commercial banking assets. Raw data are from Bankscope. 
World Bank: Global Fi-
nancial Development 
Bank nonperforming loans 
to total gross loans (%) NPL 
Value of nonperforming loans divided by the total value of 
the loan portfolio (including nonperforming loans before the 
deduction of specific loan-loss provisions). 
World Bank: World De-
velopment Indicators 
Bank Z-score Z-Score 
It captures the probability of default of a country's commer-
cial banking system. Z-score compares the buffer of a coun-
try's commercial banking system (capitalization and returns) 
with the volatility of those returns. 
World Bank: Global Fi-
nancial Development 
Boone indicator  Boone 
A measure of degree of competition based on profit-effi-
ciency in the banking market. It is calculated as the elasticity 
of profits to marginal costs. An increase in the Boone indica-
tor implies a deterioration of the competitive conduct of fi-
nancial intermediaries. 
World Bank: Global Fi-
nancial Development 
Borrowed from a financial 
institution (% age 15+) BorrowedFI 
Percentage of respondents who report borrowing any money 
from a bank or another type of financial institution in the past 
12 months. 
World Bank: Global 
Findex 
Borrowers at a commercial 
bank per 1.000 adults BorrowersCB 
Calculated as: (number of borrowers with commercial banks) 
x 1.000/adult population in the reporting country. 
International Monetary 
Fund: Financial Access 
Survey 
Domestic credit to private 
sector (% of GDP) DcreditPS 
Financial resources provided to the private sector by financial 
corporations, such as through loans, purchases of nonequity 
securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, 
that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries these 
claims include credit to public enterprises.  
World Bank: World De-
velopment Indicators 
Domestic credit to private 
sector by banks (% of GDP) DcreditbyB 
Financial resources provided to the private sector by other de-
pository corporations (deposit taking corporations except cen-
tral banks), such as through loans, purchases of nonequity se-
curities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that 
establish a claim for repayment. For some countries these 
claims include credit to public enterprises. 
World Bank: World De-
velopment Indicators 
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Table 2 (cont.). Definitions and data sources of used variables 
Variable Symbol Definition Data source 
H-statistic H-Statistic 
A measure of the degree of competition in the banking mar-
ket. It measures the elasticity of banks revenues relative to in-
put prices. 
World Bank: Global Fi-
nancial Development 
Lending minus inflation  
rate LMI 
Own calculation: Lending interest rate (%) – inflation, con-
sumer prices (annual %). Whereas lending rate is the bank rate 
that usually meets the short-and medium-term financing 
needs of the private sector. 
World Bank: World De-
velopment Indicators 
Lerner index Lerner 
A measure of market power in the banking market. It compares 
output pricing and marginal costs (that is, markup). An increase 
in the Lerner index indicates a deterioration of the competitive 
conduct of financial intermediaries. Calculated from underlying 
bank-by-bank data from Bankscope. 
World Bank: Global Fi-
nancial Development 
Risk premium on lending 
(lending rate minus treasury 
bill rate, %) 
 RPOL 
Interest rate charged by banks on loans to private sector cus-
tomers minus the "risk free" treasury bill interest rate at which 
short-term government securities are issued or traded in the 
market. 
World Bank: World De-
velopment Indicators 
Independent Variables       
Boone indicator  Boone 
A measure of degree of competition based on profit-effi-
ciency in the banking market. It is calculated as the elasticity 
of profits to marginal costs. An increase in the Boone indica-
tor implies a deterioration of the competitive conduct of fi-
nancial intermediaries. 
World Bank: Global Fi-
nancial Development 
Branches of commercial 
banks per 100.000 adults BranchesCB 
Calculated as: (number of commercial banks + number of com-
mercial bank branches) x 100.000/adult population in the report-
ing country. 
International Monetary 
Fund: Financial Access 
Survey 
Domestic credit to private 
sector (% of GDP) DcreditPS 
Financial resources provided to the private sector by financial 
corporations, such as through loans, purchases of nonequity 
securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, 
that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries these 
claims include credit to public enterprises. 
World Bank: World Devel-
opment Indicators 
GDP growth (annual %) GDP growth 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based 
on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 
2010 U.S. dollars. 
World Bank: World Devel-
opment Indicators 
GDP per capita (constant 
2010 US$) GDP per capita 
Gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP 
is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in 
the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies 
not included in the value of the products. 
World Bank: World Devel-
opment Indicators 
Index of Economic Free-
dom IOEF 
The score focuses on four key aspects of the economic envi-
ronment: rule of law, government size, regulatory efficiency, 
market openness and assesses them by twelve specific com-
ponents of economic freedom. 
Heritage Foundation 
Legal Origin eng, french, ger, scan, soc 
Legal historic tradition in a country and on which kind of law it is 
rooted. 
Djankov et al. (2007), La 
Porta et al. (2008), CIA: The 
World Factbook 
Lending minus inflation rate LMI 
Own calculation: Lending interest rate (%) – inflation, con-
sumer prices (annual %) 
Whereas lending rate is the bank rate that usually meets the 
short-and medium-term financing needs of the private sector. 
World Bank: World Devel-
opment Indicators 
Population density (people 
per sq. km of land area) Popdensity Midyear population divided by land area in square kilometers. 
World Bank: World Devel-
opment Indicators 
Private credit bureau cover-
age (% of adults) PCB coverage 
Number of individuals or firms covered by a private credit bureau 
with information on their repayment history, unpaid debts, or 
credit outstanding from the past 5 years. 
World Bank: Doing 
Business 
Public credit registry cover-
age (% of adults) PCR coverage 
Number of individuals or firms covered by a public credit registry 
with information on their repayment history, unpaid debts, or 
credit outstanding from the past 5 years. 
World Bank: Doing 
Business 
Unemployment, total (% 
of total labor force) Unemployment 
Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that 
is without work but available for and seeking employ-
ment. Based on International Labour Organization data. 
World Bank: World De-
velopment Indicators 
The table provides definitions and data sources for all the variables that are used in the regressions. 
Table 2. Summary statistics for regression 1 and 2 
The table presents descriptive statistics for the data used in the regression. Data are rounded on the second 
decimal point position. Further variable definitions and data sources are provided in Appendix Table 1. 
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Variable Exp. Influence Symbol Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. 
          
Dependent variable         
          
Account  156 49.73 41.77 31.05 1.10 100.00 
AccountFI  156 48.89 41.77 31.69 1.10 100.00 
BorrowedFI  156 10.94 10.56 6.56 0.67 31.11 
BorrowersCB  101 198.28 136.46 221.60 1.34 1100.88 
         
Independent variable        
         
BranchesCB + 185 19.68 13.10 25.66 0.69 256.15 
GDP growth + 195 3.46 3.75 5.70 -62.08 24.10 
GDP per capita + 195 13606.52 5386.96 19216.95 219.01 103756.20 
IOEF + 180 59.93 60.10 11.59 1.00 89.90 
Legal Origin        
  eng - / + 186 0.34 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
  french - / + 186 0.46 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
  ger - / + 186 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 
  soc - / + 186 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00 
PCB coverage + 189 26.34 3.95 35.45 0.00 100.00 
PCR coverage + 189 9.28 0.00 17.28 0.00 93.10 
Popdensity + 217 418.08 85.33 1916.15 0.14 18703.00 
Unemployment - 175 8.66 7.05 6.03 0.35 31.05 
Table 3. Summary statistics for panel regression 
The table presents descriptive statistics for the data used in the regression. Data are rounded on the second 
decimal point position. Further variable definitions and data sources are provided in Appendix Table 1.  
Variable Exp. Influence Symbol Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent 
variable 
            
5BC *     1252.00 81.23 84.65 17.20 -0.14 100.00 
BC *     1491.00 71.93 72.71 19.90 2.78 100.00 
Boone *     1612.00 -0.07 -0.05 0.16 -2.00 1.64 
DcreditbyB  *    1957.00 49.71 38.08 42.23 0.42 312.15 
DcreditPS  *    1956.00 52.53 39.16 45.38 0.43 312.15 
H-Statistic *     593.00 0.57 0.59 0.25 -0.67 1.71 
Lerner *     1196.00 0.28 0.28 0.13 -0.59 0.94 
LMI    *  1531.00 -9.52 5.68 609.49 -23832.07 62.62 
NPL   *   1469.00 6.46 3.93 7.10 0.01 59.76 
RPOL    *  865.00 7.21 4.92 14.03 -6.43 330.19 
Z-score     * 1761.00 11.71 9.81 8.27 -12.61 66.10 
Independent 
variable 
           
BranchesCB  +    1951.00 19.64 12.88 26.74 0.24 289.83 
Boone   - / +   1612.00 -0.07 -0.05 0.16 -2.00 1.64 
DcreditPS   +  - 1956.00 52.53 39.16 45.38 0.43 312.15 
GDP growth - / + + - - + 2146.00 3.88 3.80 5.06 -62.08 36.52 
GDP per capita - / + + - - + 2124.00 13455.55 4829.36 19310.98 205.07 145221.0 
IOEF - + - - + 2053.00 59.90 59.60 11.39 1.00 90.10 
LMI  -    1531.00 -9.52 5.68 609.49 -23832.07 62.62 
PCB coverage - + - - + 2212.00 23.51 0.00 34.16 0.00 100.00 
PCR coverage - + - - + 2212.00 7.79 0.00 16.39 0.00 100.00 
Popdensity - / +   -  2387.00 404.94 82.78 1849.44 0.14 19392.94 
Unemployment - / + - + + - 1750.00 8.54 7.00 6.09 0.10 37.60 
